HISTORY OF WESTERN EDUCATION finding the law that rules his life within himself, and he maintains that, in so far as the external restrictions are capable of passing into this inner law, they make for true liberty. But the proviso must be noted. It is not constraint as such that is good : only the constraint that ultimately approves itself to a self-determining being. Kant is quite in agreement with Rousseau about the badness of contemporary society, and of the education that prepares for it. The education that reconciles freedom and law must be very different from the ordinary education. It must be one directed by the ideal of a perfect humanity. " Children should be educated, not with reference to the present conditions of things, but rather with regard to a possibly improved state of the human race—that is, according to the ideal of humanity and its entire destiny."* In his discussion of the actual work of education, he holds strangely aloof from all the usual questions of curriculum and method. His main concern is with what goes on in the experience of the individual pupil in the -different stages of educational advancement. One of the few definite opinions he expresses on practical matters is that public education is to be preferred to private, because of the moral effects of the restraints imposed on the pupil by his contact with his fellows. At the same time, he is no believer in national education under the direction of kings and princes. (t Experience teaches us that the ultimate aim of princes is not the promotion of the good of mankind, but the well-being of their own state and the attainment of their own ends. When they provide money for educational enterprises, they reserve to themselves the right to control the plans." " There- fore/* he adds, " the management of the schools should be left entirely to the judgment of the most intelligent experts, "f In matters educational, Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827) was a better Kantian than Kant himself. It is true that he was not a philosopher in any academic sense of the term, and that he had probably read none of Kant's works. But, like Kant, he had been profoundly moved by the Emile, and he had talked much with people more scholarly than himself who had come under the influence of Kant, with the result that his social ideals and his general conception of mental process (so far as it went) were very much like those of the great philosopher. At any rate, his principles and methods were just such as Kant might have evolved * On Pedagogy, p. 15. f Ibid.> p. 17.